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Summary
• Britain, currently on course for a referendum on 
its EU membership, has a long and entrenched 
tradition of Euroscepticism. Its voters have 
been consistently less likely than their 
continental neighbours to think positively about 
EU membership and the EU more generally.
• While British attitudes towards EU membership 
have often been volatile, a significant proportion 
of the population has consistently expressed a 
desire for Britain to leave the EU or fundamentally 
reform the terms of its membership.
• Our analysis of around 30,000 Britons reveals 
that, broadly, those who would vote to leave 
the EU tend to have left school before their 
17th birthday, to have few or no advanced 
academic qualifications, to be over 55 years 
old, and to work in less secure, lower-income 
jobs. In contrast, those who want Britain to 
remain a member of the EU tend to be younger, 
to be more highly educated, and to have more 
financially secure and professional jobs.
• These two groups think fundamentally differently 
about the EU and about the issues that feed into 
the debate on Europe. Those who are currently 
planning to vote to leave the EU are motivated 
mainly by their dissatisfaction with how, in 
their view, democracy is working at the EU 
level, and also by their strong concerns over 
immigration and its perceived effects on Britain’s 
economy, culture and welfare state. 
• In the context of the ongoing refugee crisis 
and the accompanying debate over immigration 
in Britain, it is likely that the salience of these 
concerns over immigration and the functioning 
of EU democracy will increase. The anti-EU 
‘leave’ camp – or ‘outers’ – will need to mobilize 
these concerns at the ballot box, while for the 
pro-EU ‘remain’ camp – or ‘inners’ – much will 
depend on its ability to ease voters’ concerns 
over immigration and seemingly distant 
EU institutions.
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Introduction
In 2013 Prime Minister David Cameron pledged to 
hold a referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU. 
The outcome of the 2015 general election, at which his 
Conservative Party secured a parliamentary majority, has 
put the country on course for a ‘remain-or-leave’ vote by 
the end of 2017, after an intended renegotiation of the 
terms of Britain’s membership. The referendum will have 
a major impact on domestic politics, and will profoundly 
influence the country’s role in Europe and the world. 
Recent surveys and polls suggest that a majority of the 
public will vote to remain in the EU, but also indicate that 
between around a third and nearly half of the population 
intend to vote to leave. More recently, however, amid the 
escalating refugee crisis and with economic performance 
in the eurozone lagging behind Britain’s current economic 
trajectory, evidence has emerged that the referendum 
race has tightened.
The referendum will have a major impact 
on domestic politics, and will profoundly 
influence the country’s role in Europe 
and the world.
These factors underscore the need to explore British 
Euroscepticism in more depth; hitherto, the subject has 
attracted much interest, but it remains under-researched.1 
Euroscepticism is defined here as expressing the idea of 
contingent or qualified opposition to the EU, as well as 
outright and unqualified opposition to the further economic 
and/or political integration of EU member states.2 But 
how widespread is Euroscepticism in Britain, and what 
considerations are likely to drive the ‘leave’ vote at the 
referendum? Is this vote driven mainly by concerns over 
the perceived economic costs to Britain of EU membership, 
by public dissatisfaction with how democracy appears to 
be functioning in the EU, or by anxieties over perceived 
threats to national identity and the native group from the 
free movement of EU migrant workers and as a result of 
immigration more widely? This briefing addresses these 
questions by analysing data from the British Election Study 
(BES) on more than 30,000 members of the public, collected 
around the time of the 2015 general election, to explore 
the drivers of Euroscepticism. 
Britain’s Eurosceptic tradition
Unlike many other European states, Britain has a 
long and entrenched tradition of Euroscepticism. This 
historical sense of Britain being different and distinct 
from the continent is perhaps best summed up by Winston 
Churchill’s objection, in 1953, to Britain being ‘merged 
in a Federal European system’, and his assertion that 
‘we are with them but not of them’.3 In a referendum 
in 1975, nearly seven in 10 voters opted to remain in the 
European Community (or Common Market), but mass 
pro-Europeanism was clearly absent. As academics noted 
at the time, support for membership ‘was wide but it did 
not run deep’, and did not result ‘in a girding of the loins 
for a great new European adventure’.4 The vote had been 
for the status quo, rather than for a fundamentally new 
and integrated future.
An instinctive and entrenched Euroscepticism has 
also shaped the terms of Britain’s membership of the 
EU – including through the negotiation of opt-outs 
from central aspects of European integration such as 
the single European currency and the Schengen Area. 
Euroscepticism has also remained clearly identifiable 
in public opinion. From the 1970s, the British have 
consistently been less enthusiastic about what is now 
the EU and further European integration than most, if 
not all, of their continental neighbours. This is reflected 
in survey data. Figure 1 shows the average public net 
rating of EU membership, calculated by taking the 
percentage of people who perceive their EU membership 
to be ‘good’ and subtracting the percentage of those who 
view it as ‘bad’. Numbers below zero mean that there are 
more people who think membership is bad than good. 
The ratings among British respondents have lagged 
consistently and significantly behind the EU average. 
The gap was narrowest in 1997, but even then it was still 
30 points. Only for a short period in the mid-1990s did 
the percentage of British respondents who thought EU 
membership was good exceed that of those who saw it as 
bad. As public enthusiasm about EU membership began to 
wane across the continent, the survey stopped asking the 
question in 2011.
1 There has been far more research on Euroscepticism in continental Europe. In Britain, there are some notable exceptions, including research on party-based forms 
of Euroscepticism, for example Ford and Goodwin (2014) and Goodwin and Milazzo (2015).
2 Following Taggart (1998). 
3 HC Deb 11 May 1953 vol 515 c891.
4 Butler and Kitzinger (1976), pp. 279–80.
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5 See Ford and Goodwin (2014), and Goodwin and Milazzo (2015).
Figure 1: Net good/bad ratings of EU membership, 
1973–2011
Source: Eurobarometer (annual average). 
Britain’s Eurosceptic tradition can also be observed 
by examining the public image of the EU more generally 
(rather than only opinion of EU membership). Figure 2 
presents net differences in the public image of the EU, where 
again numbers below zero indicate that more people hold 
a negative image. It shows how in recent years differences 
between the British and their neighbours have persisted. 
The British have consistently held a less positive image of 
the union than the EU average, although the gap has closed 
more recently. In 2015 the difference between respondents 
in Britain and the whole of the EU was just 18 points – in 
sharp contrast to the nearly 40-point difference in 2007. 
The most recent data also suggest that, following the sharp 
downturn in ratings of the EU after the financial crisis in 
2008, the British have become more favourable towards the 
EU. However, the net rating remains close to zero – and 
significantly below the EU average – suggesting that public 
opinion remains divided on this issue. 
The British have consistently held a less 
positive image of the union than the EU 
average, although the gap has closed 
more recently.
The British thus remain significantly less enthusiastic than 
their neighbours about EU membership and the EU more 
widely. That a large number in Britain share a Eurosceptic 
outlook can also be seen in their responses to the question 
of how they intend to vote at the referendum, which should 
first be situated in broader context. Two changes in the 
political debate have been especially important. 
The first has been the rise of organized Euroscepticism 
in domestic politics. From 2013, and in the context of the 
fragmentation of British politics as reflected in weakening 
attachments to established parties and growing volatility 
among voters, the openly Eurosceptic UK Independence 
Party (UKIP) has attracted growing support, replacing 
the Liberal Democrats as the third most popular party in 
national opinion polls. The rise of UKIP was a major reason 
David Cameron offered a referendum on EU membership, 
although this commitment did little to undermine support 
for a party that was merging concerns over immigration 
with Euroscepticism. At the 2014 European Parliament 
elections in the UK, the party won the largest share of the 
overall vote (and the largest number of seats), mirroring 
strong results for anti-EU parties across the continent. 
Support for UKIP’s ‘hard’ form of Euroscepticism came 
mainly – although not exclusively – from older, white, 
less well-educated, working-class and self-employed 
voters, who were driven foremost by concerns over 
immigration and the EU, and who also felt dissatisfied 
with the functioning of domestic politics.5 UKIP emerged 
from the 2015 general election with only one seat in the 
House of Commons, but the appeal of its stridently anti-EU, 
anti-Westminster and anti-immigration message was again 
underscored by the support of more than 12.5 per cent of 
the electorate. But this has also been about more than votes 
and seats: again, electoral pressure from UKIP was a major 
factor influencing the prime minister’s pledge to hold a 
referendum on EU membership.
Figure 2: Net positive/negative ratings of EU image, 
2003–15 
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6 See UNHCR, http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php.
7 Data taken from the Ipsos MORI Issues Tracker. 
8 In polls undertaken between 1 September and 1 November the ‘remain’ camp averaged 44 per cent and the ‘leave’ camp 39 per cent, whereas between 8 May and 
31 August the ‘remain’ camp averaged 49 per cent and the ‘leave’ camp 35 per cent (authors’ calculations).
9 See LeDuc (2001) and Renwick (2014). 
The second development concerns the ‘salience’, or 
perceived importance, of various issues. Generally, Europe 
has not been ranked as a highly important issue by voters, 
even if it excites most grassroots Conservative Party 
activists. But while the salience of Europe remained low, 
public anxiety over immigration has been fuelled to new 
heights since the general election by the acute refugee crisis 
in Europe arising particularly from the conflicts in Syria 
and Iraq, and political instability across the Middle East and 
North Africa. As of late 2015, according to data published by 
the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, some 
900,000 refugees and migrants had arrived in Europe by sea 
in the course of the year, with more than 200,000 arriving 
in October alone.6 The large inflows into EU member states 
like Germany and Sweden, as well as a more specific crisis 
at the French port of Calais from where migrants attempt to 
enter Britain, have produced a far more favourable climate 
for populist Eurosceptics who aim to conflate identity and 
security crises with opposition to the EU. Between August 
and October 2015 more than 50 per cent of the electorate 
consistently identified immigration as being among the 
most serious issues facing Britain, setting new records.7 
Generally, Europe has not been ranked as 
a highly important issue by voters, even 
if it excites most grassroots Conservative 
Party activists.
Meanwhile, evidence emerged that the margin between 
those wishing to leave and those wishing to remain in 
the EU has narrowed. In 23 polls conducted between May 
and November 2015, the last shortly before Cameron set 
out his demands for reform to the EU, the ‘remain’ vote 
averaged 46 per cent, the ‘leave’ vote 37 per cent, and 
the ‘undecided’ 17 per cent, indicating that the latter 
are likely to assume a pivotal role in the outcome of the 
referendum. Since the summer, however, and amid the 
refugee crisis, the gap between the two sides narrowed 
from 14 points to five.8 Figure 3 provides further evidence 
that the race has tightened, showing how the gap between 
the sides has narrowed since 2012. Whereas in earlier 
years the Eurosceptics enjoyed a convincing lead over those 
wanting to remain within the EU (a trend that coincided 
with the lingering eurozone crisis), in more recent months 
public support for remaining in the EU increased, before 
declining once again to correspond with the trend 
outlined above.
Figure 3: Should the UK remain a member of the EU or 
leave the EU?
Source: YouGov.
Such snapshots should be treated with caution. The 
opinion polls tell little about the underlying motives that 
are driving these public attitudes. Voting intentions may 
also change as the referendum nears and people focus more 
on the vote. This brings us to several important caveats. 
First, research on voting behaviour at referendums suggests 
that, as polling day nears, citizens often become more risk-
averse. An analysis of 34 referendums around the world 
between 1980 and 2013 found that in the final month of 
the campaign support for the ‘change’ option declined in 
23 cases and increased in only 11. The often large falls in 
support for interrupting the status quo often exceeded 
the increases that were recorded in a few cases where 
the change option prevailed.9 
There is further evidence to suggest that the ‘leave’ camp 
faces the greater challenge. When voters are asked a more 
nuanced question about the future of Britain’s relationship 
with the EU – and one that moves away from a binary 
‘remain-or-leave’ scenario – a majority are willing to remain 
within a reformed EU – which Cameron is hoping to deliver. 
The British Social Attitudes survey has for many years 
asked people their views about Britain’s relationship with 
the EU. Figure 4 shows that hard-core Eurosceptics do 
not currently represent a majority. On the contrary, when 
people are asked what should be Britain’s long-term policy 
regarding the EU, the most popular answer is to remain 
within but reduce the latter’s power. In seeking to reduce 
the powers of the EU over Britain’s parliament, Cameron 
would be following the policy most favoured by the public. 
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10 ‘Preferences for Britain’s future role in Europe’, Ipsos MORI, 26 October 2015, https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3381/
Preferences-for-Britains-future-role-in-Europe.aspx.
11 There are numerous studies but see, for example, De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005), Ford and Goodwin (2014) and Lubbers and Scheepers (2007). 
Much will depend on how successful the prime minister 
is in framing the outcome of the renegotiation as beneficial 
for Britain’s economy and society, and in making a persuasive 
case that the powers of the EU vis-à-vis the UK have been 
curbed. While only a minority of voters endorse the status 
quo, combining the various responses that are in favour 
of continuing EU membership (i.e. stay but reduce the 
powers of the EU; retain the status quo; increase EU 
powers; or create a single European government) produces 
a clear majority. As of 2014, just 24 per cent of the public 
favoured leaving, while 70 per cent favoured remaining in 
the EU, although the latter might prefer some changes to 
this relationship.
This is not the only example. In October 2015 Ipsos 
MORI gave people four options for Britain’s future role 
in Europe: move towards closer economic and political 
integration; keep the current relationship; return to being 
part of an economic community but without political 
links; or leave altogether. Only 18 per cent wanted to leave 
altogether, down from 23 per cent in 2012, indicating 
that the hard-core Eurosceptic vote is typically between 
one-fifth and one-quarter of the population. However, 
public support for deeper integration in the EU is also 
a minority position, endorsed by only 12 per cent. 
Most respondents opted for staying within the EU but 
reducing political links (37 per cent) or keeping the current 
relationship (26 per cent), suggesting that nearly two-thirds 
are instinctively receptive to staying in a reformed EU.10 
The electorate, therefore, is apparently dominated 
by a sceptical but pragmatic majority. 
Figure 4: What should Britain’s long-term policy be 
regarding the EU? 
Source: British Social Attitudes Survey, 1993–2014.
Competing explanations of Euroscepticism
The above evidence points to the conclusion that 
the ‘remain’ camp holds a clear advantage over those 
who want to leave the EU. However, it also shows that 
Euroscepticism remains fairly widespread among the 
British population. This invites the obvious question of 
what is driving this Euroscepticism. One useful starting 
point is the academic research into the factors that 
motivate these attitudes across Europe. In broad terms, 
three competing explanations of Euroscepticism have 
been put forward. Each identifies a different set of concerns 
as being the core motive: utilitarian or economic drivers; 
identity or cultural drivers; and political drivers. Each 
also offers an insight into what will drive people’s vote 
in the referendum.
According to the utilitarian approach, voters will be 
influenced by their calculation of the economic costs 
and benefits that come with EU membership. In member 
states like Britain, the single market and growing European 
integration mainly benefits citizens who are well positioned 
to take advantage of them – the economically secure, more 
highly educated, highly skilled and socially mobile. Standing 
opposite are social groups that are distinctly unlikely to 
perceive the EU as bringing any benefits – the financially 
insecure, who have few or no qualifications and little 
flexibility, who are (or feel) more exposed to competition 
as a result of the single market and the free movement 
of labour, and who feel under threat from rapid 
economic change. The Eurosceptic vote, some argue, 
is driven mainly by the latter group, and in response 
to these economic considerations.
The identity approach contends that the vote will be 
driven more strongly by concerns over cultural issues 
like immigration and perceived threats to identity, culture 
and values. The argument is that anxieties over European 
integration are less about trade, regulation and economics 
than about a pooling of national sovereignty and 
communities. The EU and its enlargement drives public 
concerns because it fuels not only the expansion of 
economic markets, but also the integration of different 
peoples and national cultures. A large number of studies 
have underscored the importance of these identity 
concerns across Europe, showing how perceived ‘threats’ 
to the native group or national identity are strong drivers 
of Eurosceptic attitudes, of opposition to the EU and of the 
possible accession of new countries like Turkey, as well as 
of electoral support for Eurosceptic parties like UKIP.11
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12 For example see Franklin et al. (1995), Van der Eijk and Franklin (1996) and Marsh (1998).
13 See Lubbers and Jaspers (2010).
The political approach instead contends that voters will 
not necessarily approach the referendum according to 
their views about the EU or the actual question on the 
ballot paper. In reality, they may be influenced more strongly 
by domestic politics, such as their feelings towards 
the government of the day.12 Seen from this perspective, 
citizens see the referendum as an opportunity not to pass 
judgment on the EU, but rather to voice their discontent 
with the incumbent party of government or politicians 
more generally.
If Euroscepticism is driven by cultural 
perceptions about immigration, then 
external events such as the refugee crisis 
may lead to changes in public opinion on 
Britain’s relationship with the EU.
Clearly, there are overlaps between all three sets of drivers. 
People with low levels of education have consistently 
been shown to feel more nationalistic and more anxious 
about integration and migration. For example, one study 
in the Netherlands found that citizens with lower levels of 
education were far more Eurosceptic than the more highly 
educated; this was associated with a growth of political 
cynicism and feelings of threat to their ethnic group.13 But 
separating the motives out in this way allows for exploration 
of their relative effects more closely. It also provides insights 
as to how Euroscepticism may continue to evolve in the 
months leading up to the referendum. For example, if it 
is driven by socio-demographic traits like education and 
class – which are relatively ‘sticky’ – then it may be expected 
that there will be relatively little change and no dramatic 
shifts in public opinion. However, if Euroscepticism is driven 
by cultural perceptions about immigration, then external 
events such as the refugee crisis may lead to changes in 
public opinion on Britain’s relationship with the EU.
Who are the ‘inners’ and ‘outers’?
The first observation that can be made after analysing 
the BES data is that there are significant differences 
between the characteristics of those voters who want to 
remain in the EU and those who want to leave. On average, 
those who have said they will vote to remain in the EU 
(the ‘inners’) tend to be younger, more educated and more 
likely to work in relatively financially secure occupations. 
As shown in Table 1, those who support continued EU 
membership are noticeably more likely than other groups 
to work in higher or lower managerial and professional 
occupations, and less likely to work in lower-income 
semi-skilled and routine jobs. More than half of the ‘inners’ 
are in typically more secure and higher-income managerial 
and professional occupations. They also tend to have more 
skills and flexibility within the labour marketplace. They 
are nearly twice as likely as ‘outers’ to have stayed in the 
education system beyond secondary school or their 18th 
birthday. They are also more likely than ‘outers’ and the 
overall sample to be between 18 and 34 years old, although 
they are spread fairly evenly across different age groups. 
For instance, nearly one in three of those who currently 
want to stay in the EU are between 35 and 54 years old 
and the same proportion are over 55 years old.
Table 1: Social background of ‘inners’, ‘outers’ and 
‘undecided’ voters






21 14 14 17
Lower managerial/
professional
35 28 29 31
Intermediate 
occupations
20 23 26 22
Small employers/
self-employed
6 7 6 6
Lower supervisory/
technical
6 9 6 7
Semi-routine 8 12 12 10
Routine 4 8 7 6
Education  
(age left school)
16 or younger 24 48 36 35
17–18 22 24 28 22
19 or older 54 29 37 44
Gender 
Male 53 50 34 49
Female 47 50 66 51
Age
18–34 35 18 31 29
35–54 31 34 37 33
55+ 33 48 31 38
N (Unweighted) 14,490 10,272 4,212 30,027
Source: 2014–2017 British Election Study (Waves 4 and 6). 
Note: Numbers in each column represent the weighted percentage of the ‘inners’, 
‘outers’ and ‘undecided’ individuals who belong to a given group. 
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The ‘outers’ are more likely than the ‘inners’ and the 
population in general to work in less secure and often 
lower-income lower supervisory, technical, semi-routine 
and routine occupations. They are also significantly more 
likely to have left school before their 17th birthday, with 
many lacking more advanced qualifications that might 
otherwise enable them to thrive in a more competitive 
labour market. ‘Outers’ are also much more likely than 
‘inners’ and the overall population to be over 55 years old, 
which means many of them came of political age long 
before the Maastricht Treaty and the advent of the euro. 
Many grew up before the onset of increased EU integration, 
and entered the workplace before university degrees 
effectively became a prerequisite to employment in many 
sectors. Yet it is important to note that not all of those who 
favour Brexit share these characteristics. While a clear 
majority exhibit this general profile, at least two-fifths are 
employed in managerial occupations, three in 10 remained 
within the education system beyond their 19th birthday, 
and nearly one in five are between 18 and 34 years old.
Attitudes of the ‘inners’ and ‘outers’
There are also significant differences in how the ‘inners’ 
and ‘outers’ think about the world around them. As shown 
in Table 2, in terms of their political ideologies the ‘inners’ 
tend to be split fairly evenly between those who identify 
with the left wing and those who place themselves in the 
centre ground. Only one in five associate themselves with 
the right wing. By contrast, almost half of ‘outers’ identify 
with the right wing. Aside from their political identification, 
these two groups also hold very different views about 
immigration, about the functioning of democracy within 
the EU, and about the British economy.
‘Outers’ are fairly united in viewing immigration as 
having negative effects. Nearly seven out of 10 consider that 
immigration has been bad for Britain’s economy, a view 
that is shared by only one in five of the ‘inners’. Nearly eight 
in 10 ‘outers’ view immigration as a burden on the country’s 
welfare state, compared with only around one in three 
‘inners’. And while nearly three out of four ‘outers’ believe 
that immigration undermines Britain’s culture, only around 
one in four ‘inners’ share this view. More generally, six out 
of 10 ‘outers’ are intensely opposed to immigration – that is, 
they say that immigration is bad for Britain’s economy and 
culture, and that migrants are a burden on the welfare state. 
Only one in 10 of the ‘inners’ subscribes to these views. 
There are, however, only modest differences between the 
two groups in terms of economic pessimism. In both, fewer 
than three in 10 believe that Britain’s economic situation 
has deteriorated in recent years.
Turning to perceptions of how democracy is, or is not, 
functioning at the EU level, there are again striking 
differences. Nearly three-quarters of those planning to vote 
to leave the EU are, unsurprisingly, dissatisfied with the 
way democracy functions within the EU. A majority of the 
‘inners’ also voice their dissatisfaction with EU democracy, 
but they feel much less strongly about this issue; this 
suggests that, while they accept there are problems, they 
are willing to overlook these when expressing their broader 
support for continued EU membership.
Table 2: Attitudes of ‘inners’, ‘outers’ and 
undecided voters
Traits Inners Outers Undecided Full 
sample
Left–right ideology
Left 41 14 23 29
Centre 39 37 41 38
Right 20 49 36 32
Dissatisfaction 
with EU democracy
Very satisfied 3 1 1 2
Fairly satisfied 21 5 15 20
A little dissatisfied 42 21 44 34
Very dissatisfied 23 72 40 44
Attitudes toward immigration
Immigration 
bad for Britain’s 
economy
21 68 45 42
Immigrants a 
burden on the 
welfare state








14 57 34 33
Perceptions of the British economy
Getting worse 25 27 27 46
About the same 29 24 27 27
Getting better 46 49 46 27
N (Unweighted) 114,490 10,272 4,212 30,027
Source: 2014–2017 British Election Study (Waves 4 and 6). 
Note: Numbers in each column represent the weighted percentage of the ‘inners’, 
‘outers’ and undecided individuals who belong to a given group. 
In many respects, undecided voters – who may yet decide 
the outcome of the referendum – look more like the ‘outers’ 
than the ‘inners’. Table 1 shows they are spread fairly evenly 
across different occupations, although they also are more 
likely than the national average to work in intermediate 
occupations, to be women and to be middle-aged, and 
to have completed secondary school, while they are less 
likely to have pursued advanced qualifications. In terms of 
their political beliefs, the undecided are less likely than the 
‘inners’ and the national population to identify with the left 
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14 We used the multivariate analysis technique of logistic regression.
wing, and more likely to view themselves as fairly centrist 
or right-leaning voters. But they too feel dissatisfied with 
the way that democracy in the EU works and, while their 
concerns over the perceived effects of immigration are less 
intense than those of the ‘outers’, large numbers of them 
view immigrants as having a negative impact.
What are the key drivers of Euroscepticism?
Which of these characteristics is likely to have the biggest 
influence on whether someone will vote for Britain to leave 
or to remain in the EU? To answer this question, we go 
beyond these descriptive statistics to explore the relative 
effect of characteristics simultaneously.14 The results of 
our statistical analysis to calculate the probability that an 
individual with a given characteristic will support leaving 
the EU, while holding other factors constant, are shown 
in Table 3. The closer a figure is to 1, the more likely it is 
that somebody with that trait supports Britain leaving the 
EU. This allows us to identity the most significant factors, 
which in turn reveal messages for the wider debate.
Feelings about how democracy works in the EU have the 
strongest effect on determining whether somebody is likely 
to be an ‘outer’. Individuals who are ‘very satisfied’ with this 
are highly unlikely to vote to leave the EU. However, there 
is almost a 50 per cent likelihood of being an ‘outer’ among 
those who are highly dissatisfied with the way they perceive 
democracy to be working in the EU. Ideological preferences 
also have a strong effect on whether or not people support 
leaving the EU. Those who see themselves as being on the 
far left have about a one in 10 likelihood of being an ‘outer’, 
while for someone on the far right the likelihood is closer 
to one in two. 
After feelings about democracy within the EU and ideology, 
attitudes toward immigration are the strongest predictor of 
whether somebody will vote to leave the EU. Those who feel 
most negatively towards immigration – who simultaneously 
feel that migration is having negative effects on Britain’s 
economy, culture and welfare state – have nearly a 50 per 
cent likelihood of being an ‘outer’. In contrast, those who 
hold more positive attitudes towards immigration – who 
simultaneously feel that migration is good for Britain’s 
economy and culture and is not a burden on the welfare 
state – have only an 11 per cent likelihood of voting to 
leave the EU. 
It is also worth considering the relative size of these 
different groups. At the time of the 2015 general election, 
just one in three of those who said they planned to vote in the 
EU referendum held all of the three negative attitudes toward 
immigration. However, another 15 per cent of those who said 
they planned to vote in the referendum expressed two of the 
three anti-immigration attitudes. Should public concern over 
immigration continue to increase in the wake of external 
events, such as the refugee crisis and the terrorist attacks 
in Paris, then it is plausible that many of those who express 
some, but not all, of the anti-immigration sentiments will 
become even more negative towards immigration. Attitudes 
to immigration are a strong predictor of likely support for 
leaving the EU, so the more salient this issue becomes, or 
the more it concerns voters, the more likely it is that the 
number of ‘outers’ will rise. Moreover, if the EU response 
to the refugee crisis has the additional effect of promoting 
greater dissatisfaction among the British public – not only 
concerning immigration but also with EU institutions – then 
it will make the challenge of keeping Britain in the EU that 
much more difficult. 
Attitudes to immigration are a strong 
predictor of likely support for leaving the EU, 
so the more salient this issue becomes, or 
the more it concerns voters, the more likely 
it is that the number of ‘outers’ will rise. 
The remaining traits have more modest effects. Someone 
who believes that the British economy has deteriorated is 
more likely to support leaving the EU. Those who believe 
that the economy is getting a lot better have a one-in-five 
likelihood of being an ‘outer’, while for those who believe 
the economy is getting a lot worse the likelihood is closer 
to one in three. Those who strongly identified as English 
were modestly more likely to support leaving than those 
who did not express any connection to an English identity. 
And even when we take into account voters’ preferences on 
issues, socio-demographics continue to predict support for 
leaving or remaining in the EU. While there are no longer 
any meaningful generational differences, those who left 
school after the age of 18 have a one-in-four likelihood 
of being an ‘outer’, but for those who left school before 
the age of 16 the likelihood is more than one in three. 
There is a similar pattern with regard to social class. Those 
employed in less financially secure and vulnerable routine 
occupations have a one-in-three likelihood of being an 
‘outer’, while for those in more secure professional jobs 
it is closer to one in four. 
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15 See for example Hobolt (2007). 
Table 3: The likelihood of voting to leave the EU



























Not at all English 0.20
Very strongly English 0.26













No anti-immigration sentiments 0.11
All three anti-immigration sentiments 0.46
Views of the economy
Getting a lot better 0.19
Getting a lot worse 0.29
Source: 2014–2017 British Election Study (Waves 4 and 6). 
Note: Figures represent the likelihood that an individual with the given trait 
would support leaving the EU, holding all other variables at their medians. 
Conclusions
The UK has a long history of Euroscepticism, and a public 
that is considerably more hostile to European integration 
than the EU average. Public attitudes to the EU referendum, 
although still fluid, have tightened in recent months, and as 
of late 2015 there is a strong prospect that the eventual vote 
may be very close. These attitudes are also underpinned by 
some sharp social divisions. Of those currently intending to 
vote to leave, a clear picture emerges: these voters tend to 
be older and to have lower levels of education, and are more 
likely to have less secure and often lower-income jobs. Those 
who currently intend to vote to remain tend to be younger 
and to be more educated, and are more likely to work in 
relatively financially secure occupations, as well being 
spread much more evenly across age ranges. The public’s 
attitude towards the functioning of democracy in the EU, 
alongside views on immigration, is the best predictor of 
whether or not they will vote to leave.
Public attitudes to the EU referendum, 
although still fluid, have tightened in recent 
months, and as of late 2015 there is a strong 
prospect that the eventual vote may be 
very close.
Of the ‘known unknowns’ about how the EU referendum 
campaign will play out over the coming months, two stand 
out. First, it is not clear how attitudes will be influenced 
by parties, the media and other opinion-formers. The 
‘signalling power’ of elites has been shown to play an 
important role in referendums, so there is good reason 
to expect them to influence the debate. Endorsements by 
leaders or parties act as cues to behaviour, particularly 
among voters who have little knowledge about the issue.15 
This can be seen in the results of a question that positions 
the referendum vote alongside a recommendation from 
the prime minister. When people are asked to imagine that 
the government has renegotiated Britain’s relationship 
with the EU and that the prime minister recommends a 
vote to remain in, and that this is in the national interest, 
a much larger majority of ‘inners’ emerges. Such cues have 
been shown to increase support for remaining in the EU 
by between 20 and 30 percentage points. Much, therefore, 
will depend upon the prime minister’s ability to frame 
the outcome of the renegotiation as being in the national 
interest. If he can do so, public support for remaining in 
the EU will likely be a firm majority position. Second, given 
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that immigration is a significant driver of Euroscepticism, 
another ‘known unknown’ is what will be the continuing 
impact of the refugee crisis and of public anxiety over 
the rising level of immigration. As set out in this briefing, 
attitudes toward immigration are a major driver of 
Eurosceptic opinion. High levels of net migration to the 
UK, combined with large-scale refugee flows into other 
European countries and the challenges this poses for EU 
cooperation, could heighten concerns about migration 
and negatively affect public perceptions of the EU. Those 
campaigning to stay in the EU will have to work hard to 
prevent these sentiments from hardening and widening.
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